‘XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) Attack’
‘XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) attack is an attack on an application that parses XML input from untrusted sources using incorrectly configured XML parser. The application may be coerced to open arbitrary files and/or TCP connections.’
‘The information has been provided by Gregory Steuck.’
‘External entity references allow embedding data outside the main file into an XML document. In the DTD, one declares the external reference with the following syntax:
<!ENTITY name SYSTEM ‘URI’>
XML processor behavior as specified is: http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#include-if-valid:
‘When an XML processor recognizes a reference to a parsed entity, in order to validate the document, the processor must include its replacement text. If the entity is external, and the processor is not attempting to validate the XML document, the processor may, but need not, include the entity’s replacement text…’
Now assume that the XML processor parses data originating from a source under attacker control. Most of the time the processor will not be validating, but it MAY include the replacement text thus initiating an unexpected file open operation, or HTTP transfer, or whatever system ids the XML processor knows how to access.
Most XML parsers allow their user to explicitly specify external entity handler. In case of untrusted XML input it is best to prohibit all external general entities.
Successful exploitation may yield:
* DoS on the parsing system by making it open, e.g. file:///dev/random | file:///dev/urandom | file://c:/con/con
* TCP scans using HTTP external entities (including behind firewalls since application servers often have world view different from that of the attacker)
* Unauthorized access to data stored as XML files on the parsing system file system (of course the attacker still needs a way to get these data back)
* DoS on other systems (if parsing system is allowed to establish TCP connections to other systems)
* NTLM authentication material theft by initiating UNC file access to systems under attacker control
* Doomsday scenario: A widely deployed and highly connected application vulnerable to this attack may be used for DDoS.
Several SOAP and XMLRPC implementation were found vulnerable. Gregory will be contacting their respective authors directly. It will be up to those authors to publish the patches and/or advisories.
The following implementations were found NOT vulnerable and the reasons contributing to their resistance were researched.
Apache XML-RPC server is NOT vulnerable in the default configuration due to its use of MinML parser which doesn’t support external entities. Yet should be vulnerable if used with a full blown parser like Xerces or Crimson. To make it invulnerable in all configurations it needs to explicitly setup an EntityResolver that aborts having found external entities.
Marqu?e XML-RPC also uses MinML and thus is NOT vulnerable.
XMLRPC-J uses freeDOM that only supports Minimal XML which lacks entity references (http://www.docuverse.com/smldev/minxml.jsp)
WebLogic 6.1sp3 SOAP implementation was NOT found vulnerable. It appears to be using a parser that ignores entities altogether.
Python 2.2 SimpleXMLRPCServer does NOT seem to be vulnerable. It can use multiple different parsers:
* xmllib.XMLParser is the default one shipped with Python. It doesn’t implement processing of doctype definition and thus doesn’t understand external entities defined in there
* ExpatParser is used when expat python-expat is installed, it understands the references but seems to replace them with empty strings unconditionally. This negates the attack.
* SGMLOP parser, judging by comments in its source doesn’t recognize external entities
* FastParser was not available for inspection’