‘Microsoft Windows Picture and Fax Viewer Library Multiple Overflow Vulnerabilities’
‘The information has been provided by Kobi Pariente and Yaniv Miron.
The original article can be found at: http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=890‘
Microsoft Windows XP SP3
Windows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2
Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2
Windows Vista Service Pack 2
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2
Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2
Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems Service Pack 2
Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in multiple versions of Microsoft Corp.’s Windows could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the targeted host.
An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the ‘shimgvw’ library. During the processing of an image within a certain function, a bitmap containing a large ‘biWidth’ value can be used to cause an integer calculation overflow. This condition can lead to the overflow of a heap buffer and may result in the execute arbitrary code on the targeted host.
Exploitation could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the targeted host under the privileges of the current logged-on user. Successful exploitation would require the attacker to entice his or her victim into viewing a specially-crafted thumbnail leveraging the vulnerability.
Some vectors of attack include e-mail, the browser and network shares. In an e-mail-based attack, the attacker must entice his or her victim into opening or previewing a specially-crafted Office document containing a specially-crafted thumbnail. In a browser-based attack, the victim must simply view a maliciously crafted website. In a network share attack, such as UNC or WebDAV, an attacker would require the victim to simply navigate to the folder containing the crafted thumbnail.
Microsoft has included an automated Microsoft Fix it solution for the Modify the Access Control List (ACL) on shimgvw.dll workaround, which can be found at the following link:
01/12/2011 Initial Vendor Notification
01/12/2011 Initial Vendor Reply
02/08/2011 Coordinated Public Disclosure’