‘Vulnerability in Graphics Rendering Engine Allows Remote Code Execution’
”Microsoft Windows Metafile Format (WMF) files are used to store both vector and bitmap-format graphical data in memory or in disk files. The vector data stored in WMF files is described as Microsoft Windows Graphics Device Interface (GDI) commands. In the Window environment these commands are interpreted and played back on an output device using the Windows API PlayMetaFile() function. Bitmap data stored in a WMF file may be stored in the form of a Microsoft Device Dependent Bitmap (DDB), or Device Independent Bitmap (DIB).’
‘The information has been provided by Microsoft Security.
The original article can be found at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/912840.mspx‘
* Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4
* Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 1
* Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2
* Microsoft Windows XP Professional x64 Edition
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003 for Itanium-based Systems
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003 with SP1 for Itanium-based Systems
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition
* Microsoft Windows 98, Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition (SE), and Microsoft Windows Millennium Edition (ME)
Microsoft is investigating new public reports of a vulnerability in Windows. Microsoft is also aware of the public release of detailed exploit code that could be used to exploit this vulnerability. Based on our investigation, this exploit code could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the user’s system by hosting a specially crafted Windows Metafile (WMF) image on a malicious Web site. Microsoft is aware that this vulnerability is being actively exploited.
Microsoft has determined that an attacker using this exploit would have no way to force users to visit a malicious Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to persuade them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker’s Web site. In an e-mail based attack, customers would have to be persuaded to click on a link within a malicious e-mail or open an attachment that exploited the vulnerability. In both the web and email based attacks, the code would execute in the security context of the logged-on user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
* In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would have to host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a malicious Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to persuade them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker’s Web site.
* In an E-mail based attack of the current exploit, customers would have to be persuaded to click on a link within a malicious e-mail or open an attachment that exploited the vulnerability.
* An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
* By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003, on Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1, on Windows Server 2003 with Service Pack 1 for Itanium-based Systems, and on Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration This mode mitigates this vulnerability where the e-mail vector is concerned although clicking on a link would still put users at risk. In Windows Server 2003, Microsoft Outlook Express uses plain text for reading and sending messages by default. When replying to an e-mail message that is sent in another format, the response is formatted in plain text. See the FAQ section of this vulnerability for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.
Frequently Asked Questions:
What is the scope of the advisory?
Microsoft is aware of a new vulnerability report affecting the Graphics Rendering Engine in Microsoft Windows. This vulnerability affects the software that is listed in the Overview section.
Is this a security vulnerability that requires Microsoft to issue a security update?
We are currently investigating the issue to determine the appropriate course of action for customers. We will include the fix for this issue in an upcoming security bulletin.
What causes the vulnerability?
A vulnerability exists in the way specially crafted Windows Metafile (WMF) images are handled that could allow arbitrary code to be executed.
What is the Windows Metafile (WMF) image format?
A Windows Metafile (WMF) image is a 16-bit metafile format that can contain both vector information and bitmap information. It is optimized for the Windows operating system.
What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of the affected system. In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would host a Web site that exploits this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a malicious Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to persuade them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker’s site. It could also be possible to display specially crafted Web content by using banner advertisements or by using other methods to deliver Web content to affected systems.
How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?
An attacker could host a malicious Web site that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then persuade a user to view the Web site.
I am reading e-mail in plain text, does this help mitigate the vulnerability?
Yes. Reading e-mail in plain text does mitigate this vulnerability where the e-mail vector is concerned although clicking on a link would still put users at risk.
Note In Windows Server 2003, Microsoft Outlook Express uses plain text for reading and sending messages by default. When replying to an e-mail message that is sent in another format, the response is formatted in plain text.
I have DEP enabled on my system, does this help mitigate the vulnerability?
Software based DEP does not mitigate the vulnerability. However, Hardware based DEP may work when enabled: please consult with your hardware manufacturer for more information on how to enable this and whether it can provide mitigation.
Does this vulnerability affect image formats other than Windows Metafile (WMF)?
At this point, the only image format affected is the Windows Metafile (WMF) format. It is possible however than an attacker could rename the file extension of a WMF file to that of a different image format. In this situation, it is likely that the Graphic Rendering engine would detect and render the file as a WMF image which could allow exploitation.
Windows Metafile (WMF) images can be embedded in other files such as Word documents. Am I vulnerable to an attack from this vector?
No. While we are investigating the public postings which seek to utilize specially crafted WMF files through IE, we are looking thoroughly at all instances of WMF handling as part of our investigation. While we’re not aware of any attempts to embed specially crafted WMF files in, for example Microsoft Word documents, our advice is to accept files only from trusted source would apply to any such attempts.
If I block .wmf files by extension, can this protect me against attempts to exploit this vulnerability?
No. Because the Graphics Rendering Engine determines file type by means other than just looking at the file extensions, it is possible for WMF files with changed extensions to still be rendered in a way that could exploit the vulnerability.
Does the workaround in this advisory protect me from attempts to exploit this vulnerability through WMF files with changed extensions?
Yes. Microsoft has tested and can confirm the workaround in this advisory help protect against WMF files with changed extensions.
It has been reported that malicious files indexed by MSN Desktop Search could lead to exploitation of the vulnerability. Is this true?
We have received reports and are investigating them thoroughly as part of our ongoing investigation. We are not aware at this time of issues around the MSN Desktop Indexer, but we are continuing to investigate.
Is this issue related to Microsoft Security Bulletin MS05-053 – Vulnerabilities in Graphics Rendering Engine Could Allow Code Execution (896424) which was released in November?
No, these are different and separate issues.
Are there any third party Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that would help protect against attempts to exploit this vulnerability?
While we don’t know of specific products or services that currently scan or detect for attempts to render specially crafted WMF files, we are working with our partners through industry programs like VIA to provide information as we have it. Customers should contact their IDS provider to determine if it offers protection from this vulnerability.
Will my anti-virus software protect me from exploitation of this vulnerability?
As of the latest update to this advisory the following members of the Virus Information Alliance have indicated that their anti-virus software provides protection from exploitation of Windows Metafile (WMF) files using the vulnerability discussed in this advisory.
In addition Microsoft is providing heuristic protection against exploitation of this vulnerability through Windows Metafile (WMF) files in our new Windows OneCare Live Beta.
As currently known attacks can change, the level of protection offered by anti-virus vendors at any time may vary. Customers are advised to contact their preferred anti-virus vendor with any questions they may have or to confirm additional information regarding their vendor s method of protection against exploitation of this vulnerability.
When this security advisory was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?
Yes. When the security advisory was released, Microsoft had received information that this vulnerability was being actively exploited.
Un-register the Windows Picture and Fax Viewer (Shimgvw.dll) on Windows XP Service Pack 1; Windows XP Service Pack 2; Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1
Microsoft has tested the following workaround. While this workaround will not correct the underlying vulnerability, it helps block known attack vectors. When a workaround reduces functionality, it is identified in the following section.
Note The following steps require Administrative privileges. It is recommended that the machine be restarted after applying this workaround. It is also possible to log out and log back in after applying the workaround. However, the recommendation is to restart the machine.
To un-register Shimgvw.dll, follow these steps:
1. Click Start, click Run, type ‘regsvr32 -u %windir%system32shimgvw.dll’ (without the quotation marks), and then click OK.
2. A dialog box appears to confirm that the un-registration process has succeeded. Click OK to close the dialog box.
Impact of Workaround: The Windows Picture and Fax Viewer will no longer be started when users click on a link to an image type that is associated with the Windows Picture and Fax Viewer.
To undo this change, re-register Shimgvw.dll by following the above steps. Replace the text in Step 1 with regsvr32 %windir%system32shimgvw.dll (without the quotation marks).
* Microsoft encourages users to exercise caution when they open e-mail and links in e-mail from untrusted sources. For more information about Safe Browsing, visit the Trustworthy Computing Web site.